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9	Attorneys for Respondents/Defendants	
0	SUPERIOR COURT OF TH	IE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
1	FOR THE COUN	TY OF VENTURA
2		
3	GOLDEN STATE WATER COMPANY, a California corporation,	Case No. 56-2013-00433986-CU-WM-VTA
14	Petitioner/Plaintiff, vs.	CASITAS MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT'S SUR-REPLY BRIEF RE HEARING ON INVALIDATION OF CASITAS MWD'S MELLO-ROOS ACT FINANCING PLAN
6	CASITAS MUNICIPAL WATER DISTRICT,	Date Action Filed: March 26, 2013
17	et al., Respondents/Defendants.	Trial: Date: October 15, 2013 Time: 8:30 a.m.
9		Dept.: 43
20	1. August 27, 2013, CFD Election R	esults. CMWD requests that the Court take
21	judicial notice of the Ventura County Registrar o	f Voters' certificate of the results of the August
22	27, 2013, Community Facilities District No. 201	3-1 (Ojai) special election attached hereto as
23	Exhibit "A." (Evid. Code §§ 451(f) and 452(c),	(g), and (h).) The voters in GSW's Ojai service
24	area approved the CFD by a resounding margin of	of 87.42% in favor and only 12.58% opposed.
25	2. GSW Has Failed to Timely Obtain	n Jurisdiction Over All Persons Interested in the
26	Validity of the CFD and, Accordingly, This Acti	on Must Be Dismissed. In its June 10, 2013,
27	minute order, this Court ruled that GSW's valida	tion action was filed prematurely and that GSW
28	should have filed it within thirty (30) days after t	the August 27, 2013, CFD election. (Govt. Code
•		1
		EF RE HEARING ON INVALIDATION PROOS ACT FINANCING PLAN

§§ 53341 and 53359.) On the date this Sur-Reply Brief is being filed, 30 days will have elapsed since the election and GSW has neither (1) filed a new or supplemental validation complaint or (2) re-published the summons needed to obtain jurisdiction over "all persons interested." The time has now run for GSW to take these actions and, accordingly, its action must be dismissed.

An action cannot be maintained if it is commenced prematurely, before accrual of the cause of action that is sought to be enforced, and an action commenced prematurely should be dismissed. *Tatum v. Ackerman* (1905) 148 Cal. 357; *Berkowitz v. Palm Springs La Quinta Development Co.* (1940) 37 Cal.App.2d 249; *Nevills v. Shortridge* (1905) 146 Cal. 277. The nonexistence of a cause of action when the suit was commenced ordinarily is a fatal defect that cannot be cured by the accrual of a cause of action *after* suit is filed. *Kredo v. Phelps* (1904) 145 Cal. 526; *Owen v. Meade* (1894) 104 Cal. 179. "Even validation actions are not exempt from the traditional principle that a justiciable action must satisfy the requirements of both ripeness and standing." *City of Santa Monica v. Stewart* (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 43, 66.

It is now too late for GSW to file a *new* validation action, as such an action would be barred by the 30-day limitations period in Govt. Code §§ 53341 and 53359. The question then becomes whether GSW can now either (1) file a supplemental complaint alleging the results of the August 27, 2013, CFD election and relate that new pleading back to its original (premature) March 26, 2013, Complaint for statute of limitations purposes or (2) simply proceed to trial on the merits without filing a supplemental complaint. CMWD submits it can do neither.

CMWD recognizes that in a typical case involving *in personam* jurisdiction the filing of a premature complaint is still effective to obtain jurisdiction over the named (and personally served) defendant(s) and does not prevent the plaintiff from later filing a supplemental complaint and relating it back to the filing date of the original complaint for statute of limitations purposes. *Radar v. Rogers* (1957) 49 Cal.2d 243, 246-250. This is an *in rem* proceeding, however, in which

Radar involved the proper application of Probate Code §§ 707, 714, and 716, which provide that (1) before an action can be instituted against an estate the plaintiff must first file a claim with the administrator of the estate and (2) the lawsuit must be filed within three months after the date the administrator rejects the claim. The plaintiffs in Radar filed their suit against the estate before the administrator was appointed. Later, after the administrator was appointed, plaintiffs filed a claim with the administrator, which was rejected, and more than three months later plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint to allege these post-filing events. On appeal from a trial court ruling

1	"[t]he only way for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the matter is to ensure that notice is given
2	to all interested persons so that the resulting judgment can be conclusive as against them."
3	"Failure to publish a summons in accordance with the statutory requirements deprives the court of
4	the power to rule upon the matter [T]he court cannot overlook a defective summons. Unless
5	the plaintiff has published a summons in compliance with the statutory requirements, the court has
6	no jurisdiction to rule upon the matter that is the subject of the action." Katz v. Campbell Union
7	High School Dist. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4 th 1024, 1032. Accord, Community Youth Athletic Center
8	v. City of National City (2009) 170 Cal.App.4 th 416, 428 ("CYAC").
9	The summons GSW used to obtain jurisdiction over "all persons interested" in this matter
0	was published in April 2013 and purported to require anyone wishing to file a responsive pleading
1	to do so by May 2, 2013, almost 4 months prior to the time this action first became "ripe" for
2	adjudication. (See Summons filed by GSW on March 29, 2013.) This summons was clearly
3	defective, as no interested person lawfully could be compelled to appear in court by May 2, 2013,
4	to defend the validity of the CFD when an uncertain and essential prerequisite to the creation of
5	the CFD and sale of CFD bonds—2/3 voter approval—had not yet occurred. See, e.g., Katz,
6	supra (validation action properly dismissed because published summons failed to specify concrete
7	response date and response date calculable from language of summons provided 6 days less than
8	the amount of time required), CYAC, supra, 170 Cal.App.4 th at 428-429 (defect in published
9	summons, which shortened response period by 3 days, "cannot be considered to be minor or
20	inconsequential, but instead is jurisdictional"), and County of Riverside v. Superior Court (1997)
21	54 Cal.App.4 th 443, 446-451 (published summons which informed its readers they had 30 days to
22	file responsive pleading but which failed to specify precise date was defective; dismissal required)
23	Strong public policy reasons support strict enforcement of the rule requiring clear and
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25	sustaining the defendant's demurrer to the supplemental complaint, the Supreme Court reversed,
26	finding that the purpose of the Probate Code claims provisions had been satisfied and the administrator had notice of the lawsuit and had suffered no prejudice. A number of similar cases
27	arise in the context of the Government Code claims presentation requirements. See, e.g., State of California v. Superior Court of Kings County (2004) 32 Cal.4 th 1234, 1243-1245, and cases cited
28	(purpose of claims statutes satisfied; no prejudice to defendant). But see <i>Lee v. Bank of America NT&SA</i> (1994) 27 Cal.App.4 th 197 (no relation back; <i>Radar</i> distinguished if revised claim is not
,	based on the same general set of facts alleged in original complaint). -3-

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1	accurate notice to the public of their deadline for filing a responsive pleading in a validation
2	action. "In a validation or reverse validation action, published notice to members of the public
3	is the <i>primary</i> means of notice. Such actions involve matters of general public interest, and there
4	is at least some reasonable expectation that potentially concerned parties will observe the notice
5	and consider whether or not to take action on one side or the other." County of Riverside, supra,
6	54 Cal.App.4 th at 450. Moreover, even though CMWD is the only indispensable party, "it does
7	not matter that all indispensable parties have appeared in the action. Our concern is with the
8	court's jurisdiction over the matter to be validated." <i>Katz</i> , <i>supra</i> , 144 Cal.App.4 th at 1033. Nor
9	does it matter that CMWD has suffered no prejudice. "The alleged absence of prejudice does not
0	supply a <i>reason</i> for plaintiff's failure to comply with the statutes." <i>Id.</i> at 1036; emph. in original.
1	At this point, it is too late for GSW to file a supplemental Complaint and try to start the
2	service process over. (See Govt. Code §§ 53341 and 53359 and CCP § 863, which requires the
3	plaintiff in a reverse validation action to file proof of its publication of the summons "within 60
4	days from the filing of his complaint.") Nor can GSW establish "good cause" under CCP § 863
5	for its failure to comply with the law. First of all, "good cause" does <i>not</i> extend the 30-day
6	limitations period in Govt. Code §§ 53341 and 53359; it applies only to service. Secondly, GSW
7	knew full well from the Court's June 10, 2013, minute order that its case was prematurely filed
8	and therefore it was on notice that its prematurely published summons was not effective.
9	"[I]gnorance of the law coupled with negligence in ascertaining it will certainly sustain a finding
20	denying relief." City of Ontario v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 335, 346; Community
21	Redevelopment Agency of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 164, 174. "The
22	procedure to be followed with respect to the form and publication of summons in such a case as
23	this is not complex the law was in all the books and readily available to plaintiffs' attorney."
24	(<i>Id.</i> at 174-175.)
25	Dated: September, 2013 RUTAN & TUCKER, LLP
26	By:
27	Jeffrey M. Oderman
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